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property rights such as tax incentives, subsidies, and
government research and development contracts to
encourage innovation and creativity, most have used,
in varying degrees and with varying levels of
enforcement, the decentralised and largely market-
driven incentive system of intellectual property,
protection.
With respect to these rights, which consist of the
granting by government of a limited monopoly to the
originator or owner of the intellectual property to use
his or her innovation or artistic creation, countries
have also set out particular rules and procedures for
ensuring that the invention or creative work is made
available to the broader public. Individually, govern-
ments have established, in effect, a domestic
intellectual property bargain. Internationally, the
nature of this bargain between originators or owners
of intellectual property and users is even more difficult
to define and to agree upon. It is on this complex area
that this article will focus.
The Policy Context
The overall purpose of intellectual property rights is to
encourage innovation and creative expression by
granting to developers of goods or services an
exclusive but limited right to whatever returns their
works might bring in the market place. The rights are
generally limited both in time and in scope. A patent
right is generally limited by a term of 20 years from the
date of filing, a copyright by the life of the artist, plus
between 25 and 50 years. With respect to scope, many
patent terms are limited by provisions for compulsory
licensing5 and by renewal fees and cannot be obtained
at all for basic research or for innovation involving
living things.6 Further, there are limitations about
what constitutes infringement of intellectual property
rights.7 In addition, intellectual property owners are
limited under the laws of most countries as to the
terms and conditions that they can impose on their
Compulsory licensing refers to the practice whereby governments
grant to someone other than the intellectual property owner the
right to use the intellectual property in question in return for a
royalty payment.
There is currently a lively debate, as well as several court cases, with
respect to the patentability of living things in the USA.
For example, the 'fair use' doctrine provides for copying for
purposes of scholarly research that would otherwise be an
infringement of copyright.
Introduction
One of the principal areas of trade policy interest -
and at times conflict - in recent years has concerned
intellectual property rights.2 In a period of accelerating
technological change and increased world trade, these
rights have become more valuable to those who
develop or own them. Conversely, the use, import or
transfer of technology under reasonable terms has
become more important for competitiveness and
growth in virtually all countries engaged in
international trade. Trade disputes over intellectual
property have mounted rapidly in recent years as
intellectual property owners have pressed their
governments to strengthen intellectual property
regimes domestically and internationally, including
the use of border action or domestic courts to protect
their rights.
To a significant extent, the same issue that has formed
a central part of the international discussion
concerning intellectual property has mirrored long-
standing debate and legislative initiatives in various
national jurisdictions. That issue is how society as a
whole should encourage innovation and creative
expression most efficiently and fairly, while at the
same time ensuring that it has reasonable access to the
knowledge or creativity thereby created.3
Countries at different times in their economic
development, and different countries at broadly the
same stage of economic development, have come to
different outcomes or solutions with respect to this
issue.4 While countries have also used policy
instruments other than the granting of intellectual
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not
necessarily those of the Government of Canada.
2 These rights include patents, copyrights. trademarks, geographical
tndications. neighbouring rights, integrated circuits, industrial
designs and trade secrets.
it has long been recognised in the scholarly literature [Norclhaus
1969] that there ts an optimal life for an intellectual property right.
The trade-off involves the social benefits of making inventions and
creative xvorks freely available to all once they have been developed,
on the one hand, and on the other providing sufficient protection of
intellectual property rights to ensure that new inventions and
creative works will indeed take place.
For example, the protection provided under the original United
States copyright law was granted only to books, charts and maps
and was not extended to works of foreign origin. In Japan. product
as against process patents were not in place until 1976.
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customers, agents or licensees. For example, national
competition law often limits the ability of rights
owners to engage in business practices such as tied
selling, exclusive dealing, territorial restrictions and
resale price maintenance.
The granting of the intellectual property right together
with all the limitations on the duration and scope of
the intellectual property originator's exclusive owner-
ship - the intellectual property bargain between the
intellectual property owner and user - varies
amongst both developed and developing countries
and has varied within individual countries over time.
Those who have advocated the strengthening of these
rights have based their case on the effectiveness of
intellectual property rights, both absolutely and
relative to other innovation incentive schemes, in
inducing additional innovation and creativity. They
point to evidence that patent rights, for example, are
essential to the conduct of privately-funded industrial
research and development in many large and strategic
industries, notably pharmaceuticals, fine chemicals,
petroleum and machinery.9 They also point to
significant foregone revenues - and thus potential
research and development - on the part of
intellectual property owners in these and other
industries, from weak or non-existent intellectual
property standards or enforcement in the international
market place.9
Those on the other hand who have questioned the
scope and duration of existing intellectual property
rights and have resisted their strengthening have
claimed that a diminution of such rights will not
reduce the value of resources devoted to innovation or
creative expression to any significant degree. A
particular case is made by those from smaller
industrial and from developing countries that since
their countries provide, at best, marginal markets for
originators of intellectual property, changes in their
policies will have little effect on the development of
new intellectual property world-wide. From this
perspective, there is a global efficiency rationale or
argument for smaller countries providing less
intellectual property protection than that provided for
in the major world centres of innovation and creative
expression. Still others argue that while diminution of
intellectual property rights might well lead to an exit of
'Mansfield 119861 finds that, based on a sample of commercially-
introduced inventions, 60 per cent of pharmaceutical inventions.
38 per cent of chemical, 25 per cent of petroleum and 17 per cent of
machinery Inventions would not have been developed in the absence
of patent protection.
'A survey conducted in the USA suggests that in 1986, asa result of
either infringement or inadequate intellectual property rights. liS
firms had their profits reduced by some $755 mn and incurred
additional losses in foreign royalty income in the amount of$3. I bn.
Stern [19871 makes the point that a country which refuses as a
matter of policy to pay for the innovative or creative content of
imported goods and services is imposing a tax on these iinports
which is, in principle, the same as a tariff.
some from innovative or creative activity, this will
serve to reduce duplication as well as premature and
hurried innovation [see, for example, Dasgupta and
Stiglitz 1980]. The overall flow of new, usable
knowledge from a global perspective, it is argued, will
not be reduced.
All these arguments and counter-arguments enter into
the calculus of striking the appropriate intellectual
property balance between the originator and the user
nationally and internationally. Each outcome, in the
form of various countries' national legislation and
procedures and in the international intellectual
property conventions, has its benefits and costs, At
essence is the conundrum that if new technologies and
artistic works that are encouraged by intellectual
property protection and that are valuable and
necessary for society's progress were to be freely
available, there would be no financial incentive to
produce them. National societies and the international
community must find the appropriate balance.
There are therefore no absolutes with respect to what
the intellectual property bargain struck within each
country and amongst countries should be. Intellectual
property-originating sectors within a national economy
and countries whose exports comprise a large
intellectual property content will tend to favour a
stronger intellectual property regime. Intellectual
property users within a society, as well as importers,
will tend to have less interest in maintaining and
strengthening the intellectual property system, which
will largely serve to reward foreign inventors and
artists without materially influencing the global or
socially optimal pace of innovative and creative
activity.
The Trade Question
With increasing globalisation of the world economy,
comprising increased movement of goods, services,
capital, technology and know-how across national
borders, the complex and continually evolving
intellectual property bargain within each individual
national jurisdiction has become an ever-larger issue
on the international trade agenda.io The necessity of
some type of international coordination or regulation
with respect to intellectual property was recognised in
the latter half of the nineteenth century as world
commerce grew dramatically. A number of inter-
national conventions covering patents, trademarks
and copyright were negotiated and signed in the late
1880s, while other conventions covering subjects such
as phonograms and plant varieties were developed in
the course of this century.tt An international
organisation to service these conventions, the World
°Trade in machinery and equipment. aircraft, electrical products.
chemicals, and scientific equipment embody a high intellectual
property component.
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Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), based in
Geneva, was established some 20 years ago. More
recently, regional consultative and administrative
arrangements and organisations have also developed,
the most notable being the European Patent Office
based in Munich and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
Not all countries participating in the world trading
system, however, have joined each of the international
intellectual property conventions. In other cases,
countries that are members of one or more of the
conventions have accepted only lower levels of
obligations. Further, both the conventions and WIPO
have lacked enforcement and dispute settlement
facilities to require member countries to discharge
their obligations. As trade in goods and services
embodying intellectual property has expanded, the
lack of an international instrument to effectively
counter abuses, including counterfeit goods and
pirated services, has become a larger and larger
problem in the world trading system.'2 One result of
this lack of an effective, multilateral discipline has
been the resort to unilateral and discriminatory trade
action on the part of intellectual property-originating
countries against those countries practising, or alleged
to be practising, 'illegal' or 'unfair' measures with
respect to intellectual property. Trade instruments
such as US Section 301 and the so-called special and
super 30114 represent an unhealthy development with
respect to the international trade system, one that
could lead to a further decline in the effectiveness and
credibility of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the collective guardian of the world's
'rules of the road' with respect to trade.
Attempts to bring trade-related intellectual property
(TRIPS) more fully into the system of international
trade rules began towards the end of the Tokyo Round
For example, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property [1883], the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literacy and Artistic Works [1886]. the International Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and
Broadcasting Organisations [1961], and the International Con-
vention for the Protection of New varieties of Plants [19611.
The conventions are largely silent with respect to international trade
per se. Yet intellectual property rights granted by national
governments have historically includedthe right to prohibit imports
from infringing sources. To the extent that the definition of
infringement varies from country to country (i.e. whether or not
copyright protection applies not only to blueprints but also to the
objects depicted in them, or whether or not the parallel iniportation
of goods covered either by a patent nra trademark is permitted),
trade patterns can be distorted.
°Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended in 1984
characterises the lack of intellectual property protection as an unfair
trade practice. and therefore subject to trade retaliatory measures.
O The United States Trade Representative (USTRI is required to
identify 'priority' countries that do not provide adequate protection
to USA holders of intellectual property rights, or fair access USA
exporters who rely on intellectual property protection. The USTR is
required to investigate all such cases that it identifies, and within six
months to determine whether action is necessary. If this is the case,
actions are required within 30 days.
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of global trade negotiations in the l970s. A draft
counterfeit code was developed but not agreed to at
that time, while subsequent attempts continued to be
made by some countries in the early 1980s to expand
the GATT into rapidly evolving areas of world
commerce, particularly those where it was thought
that serious trade distortions were taking place. After
much discussion and negotiation in the months
leading up to the Punta Del Este Ministerial
declaration in 1986, trade-related intellectual property
became a separate item with its own negotiating group
in the Uruguay Round.tS The global trade talks are
now in their final, intensive phase.
What has been and remains at stake is the intellectual
property bargain on an international scale, with 97
participating countries with widely different economic
interests and perspectives concerning both intellectual
property and all the other issues on the global trade
negotiations agenda involved. The principal intellectual
property proponents in the Uruguay Round, countries
such as the USA, the European Community and
Japan where intellectual property originates and finds
its way into a substantial share of their exports, have in
essence sought better domestic coverage and enforce-
ment of intellectual property laws in all countries,
developed and developing. They have based their
positions both on natural justice and, more
importantly in the trade context, on the argument that
inadequate intellectual property standards and
enforcement can provide an unfair trade advantage to
exporters from such countries. The adversely affected
party, they suggest, should thus be permitted under
internationally-accepted rules to take retaliatory trade
action against these unfair traders as is the case with
respect to other unfair practices.
For those countries that are primarily users and
importers of intellectual property, the issue involving
trade-related intellectual property in the Uruguay
Round is whether they will be better off negotiating a
multilateral trade agreement to provide a legal
framework for such arrangements within the GATT,
in the hope that this will achieve a better outcome for
them in terms of open markets, access to technology,
and their investment environment and for the world
trading system more generally than would be achieved
by bilateral actions and arrangements, or whether by
agreeing to bring intellectual property issues into the
GATT they risk even more pressure being brought
against them. Since there are no absolutes involved
with respect to intellectual property regimes, and a
variety of interests and objectives in the Round in all
areas under negotiation, the outcome will depend at
iiThe stated objective of the Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPS
agreed to by all Ministers at the Punta del Este opening session in
September, 1986 is to develop a comnson set of rules and disciplines
which will provide adequate and effective protection for intellectual
property rights, while ensuring that these rights do not disrupt
legitimate trade.
the end of the day on hard judgments concerning both
national and international interests.
Among the many elements that will have a bearing on
the outcome of the Uruguay Round in this area, four
might be particularly important. One will be the
strength of the demand for improvements in the
world's intellectual property regime under the
auspices of the GATT. The interests at stake for the
demandeurs in the Uruguay Round are broad and
include agriculture, access with respect to high
technology products, and the liberalisation of services.
Their interests with respect to intellectual'property, on
the other hand, are concentrated in a few, albeit major,
industries'6, which will have to be assessed in the larger
national interest of each of these countries.
Second, demandeurs will have to assess whether
achieving their objectives with respect to intellectual
property in other ways, particularly through bilateral
negotiations, is a preferred alternative. From the
standpoint of inducing other countries to strengthen
intellectual property rights, the bilateral approach
appears in recent years to have been a highly effective
approach from the demandeurs' perspective [see US
General Accounting Office 1987]. The danger in this
approach, however, in that it can undermine the
credibility and effectiveness of the entire multilateral
rules-based trading system, and tend to impose on
other countries the intellectual property bargain that
has been struck in the demandeur's country.
Third, since the GATT system is essentially a
bargaining framework, the determination of what
constitutes adequate protection and enforcement of
intellectual property will depend in the end on self-
interested bargaining motivated by the promise of
mutual gain to be shared among originators and users
and among net exporters and net importers of
intellectual property. As countries examine their
actual or potential export possibilities involving
intellectual property, as well as other areas such as
textiles or tropical products where progress might well
be made as part of an overall Uruguay Round
outcome, many, if not all, will find that a common set
of rules and disciplines that will provide such
protection while not distorting trade is very much in
their longer-term economic development and trade
interests. Negotiations, particularly in the 'new' issue
areas, involve a high degree of learning.
Fourthly, whether the central GATT principles of
national treatment, non-discrimination, transparency
and dispute settlement can be successfully brought to
bear on so complex an issue in the time available to
negotiate will also influence the nature and scope of
the Uruguay Round outcome in this area. National
6 The pressures for actions to be taken internationally are most
heavily concentrated in the pharmaceutical. chemical, computer,
software, entertainment, and telecommunications sectors.
treatment in the intellectual property context, for
example, applies to persons; the same principle in the
international trade context applies to goods. This
principle and the others will have to be reconciled and
made operational without a great deal ¿f precedent for
negotiators to fall back on. While much experience
was gained in the Canada-USA free trade negotiations
in this area during 1986-87, for example, all that was
negotiable at the end of the day was a commitment to
seek to develop multilateral solutions in the Uruguay
Round. 7
Conclusion
Reaching an international consensus on an acceptable
and appropriate intellectual property bargain in the
light of continually-evolving domestic and inter-
national perspectives reflected in the laws, procedures
and practices involving intellectual property of all the
countries participating in the Uruguay Round will be
difficult for all the reasons noted above. As in the case
of other areas of negotiation where significant
international differences exist, a successful outcome of
the current global trade talks will ensure that effective
mutlilateral disciplines, reflecting varying national
interests and perspectives, will have been brought to
bear on this complex subject where the underlying
policy conflict is so profound.
'7The approach used in the FTA negotiations to address the
standards issue suggests that GATT involvement in TRIPS should
not be seen by any country as a threat to WIPO or to other
international institutions dealing with intellectual properly matters.
What is also clear from the FTA experience is that any GATT
agreement must bear directly on' the problems related to the way
that Section 337. under which the USA International Trade
Commission is permitted to provide relief from unfair trade
practices, and which has recently been found by a GATT panel to be
in violation of the GATT national treatment principle, is used to
deal with cases of alleged infringements of intellectual property, lt
will also have to deal with those unilateralist featsires of section 301
which currently substitute for a more orderly multilateral despite
resolution mechanism.
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